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INTRODUCTION 
How should the Constitution think about “outsourced law en-
forcement”—that is, investigative activity carried out by private actors 
that substitutes, in practice, for the labor of law enforcement officials?  
Existing doctrine offers a simple answer to this question, centered on 
chronology.  If the government was responsible for outsourcing law 
enforcement—if a private actor was operating as an “agent or instru-
ment” of the state—Fourth Amendment scrutiny applies, just as it 
would apply to the conduct of state officials.1  If, on the other hand, 
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Law; Visiting Fellow, Information Society Project, Yale Law School.  Many thanks to BJ 
Ard, James Grimmelmann, Rachel Schwartz, Andrew Selbst, Priscilla Smith, Andrew Tutt, 
and Carly Zubrzycki, for helping develop the ideas explored here; to my colleagues at 
NYU, for commenting on an earlier draft of the piece; and to the editors of the Journal of 
Constitutional Law, for inviting me to participate in a bracing symposium on the future of 
Fourth Amendment law, and for getting the Essay into publishable shape.  Errors are 
mine. 
 1 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971) (“The test . . . is whether [the 
private actor], in light of all the circumstances of the case, must be regarded as having 
acted as an ‘instrument’ or agent of the state . . . .”); see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. 
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 615 (1989) (noting that, if the “specific features of [a regulatory re-
gime] combine” in a way that strongly encourages or facilitates private searching, that can 
convert private searches into state action); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 
(1984) (discussing the “agent of the Government” exception to the private search rule). 
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the outsourcing transpired voluntarily—if a private actor decided, 
without prodding, to assist the authorities—no Fourth Amendment 
scrutiny applies.2  This rule is often called the “private search” rule.  I 
adopt that label here. 
My goal is to suggest that the private search rule suffers a crucial 
blind spot, one that goes to the heart of Fourth Amendment privacy.  
When it comes to private searches, what we should care about is not 
which party—private actor or state official—initiated the relationship.  
What we should care about is whether the private actor, in monitor-
ing other private actors, effectively stepped into the shoes of law en-
forcement.  The doctrine should ask whether the privacy-eroding 
conduct underpinning the search was functionally similar to—and 
should be subject to the same regulation as—the privacy-eroding 
conduct of law enforcement officials.3 
Against this backdrop, the private search rule is not so much ill-
formed as it is under-inclusive.4  In fact, it makes sense that if private 
actors operate as agents or instruments of the state, the Fourth 
Amendment comes into play—because when that happens, law en-
 
 2 See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 115 (“The initial invasions of respondents’ package were occa-
sioned by private action. . . . Whether those invasions were accidental or deliberate, and 
whether they were reasonable or unreasonable, they did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment because of their private character.” (footnote omitted)); see also United States v. Jar-
rett, 338 F.3d 339, 341 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that a hacker’s search of defendant’s 
computer, despite breaking the law, did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the 
hacker was not acting as a “Government agent”); United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449 
(5th Cir. 2001) (holding that one spouse’s entry onto the other spouse’s property was not 
a Fourth Amendment search, but rather was a private search, despite the fact that she did 
not have permission to enter). 
 3 This “blind spot” has not gone unnoticed by existing scholarship, but interventions have 
historically focused on settings where private actors look and feel like law enforcement of-
ficials—such as private security guards.  See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Po-
licing, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMONOLOGY 49 (2004); id. at 50 n.6 (compiling other sources); 
David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165 (1999).  In other words, the 
full scope of the problem in the age of big data—that private actors with no aesthetic sim-
ilarity to police officers now have the capacity to assist in data-driven law enforcement in-
vestigation—has not been fully examined to date.  Nevertheless, two recent articles have 
begun to fill the scholarly gap.  See generally Kimberly Brown, Outsourcing, Data Insourcing, 
and the Irrelevant Constitution, 49 GA. L. REV. 607 (2015) (exploring the ways in which out-
sourcing of government functions, paired with data “insourcing” by state agencies, per-
mits the circumvention of various regulatory mechanisms, including constitutional rules); 
Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Private Dragnets (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author) (arguing that Fourth Amendment scrutiny should generally extend to dragnet 
surveillance in the private realm, and in particular to information companies that per-
form dragnet data surveillance). 
 4 Cf. John M. Junker, The Structure of the Fourth Amendment:  The Scope of The Protection, 79 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1105, 1139 (1989) (describing the private search doctrine as 
“disturbingly broad” in its implications). 
Feb. 2016] OUTSOURCED LAW ENFORCEMENT 799 
 
forcement clearly is outsourced.  But this is not the only time law en-
forcement gets outsourced.  It can also be outsourced when private 
actors take up the mantle of policing voluntarily.  In other words, the 
difficulty with the private search rule is that it turns agency law prin-
ciples into the linchpin of doctrine, instead of recognizing that agen-
cy principles reflect—but are not exhaustive of—the variable we real-
ly care about, which is this:  did private action effectively supplant the 
need for law enforcement involvement at a particular stage of the in-
vestigative process?  By performing the search in question, was the 
private actor assisting the investigative labor of law enforcement; or 
was the private actor fully displacing the investigative labor of law en-
forcement?  In the latter case, Fourth Amendment scrutiny—at least 
in some measure—is warranted.5 
This reframing is especially pressing in the age of big data, when 
private actors increasingly have access—or have the means to get ac-
cess—to large volumes of sensitive information about other people.6  
Against this backdrop, it makes little sense for the doctrine to treat all 
private searches alike.  In a way that has never previously been true, 
investigative work that has traditionally been the exclusive province of 
the police (and been subject to Fourth Amendment protection) is in-
creasingly falling to private actors and triggering no constitutional 
scrutiny of any kind.7 
This status quo is intolerable.  In what follows, I trace the origin of 
the private search rule in three key Supreme Court cases:  Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire,8 United States v. Jacobsen,9 and Skinner v. Railway Labor 
 
 5 In practice, this often means that probable cause is required.  But it does not always mean 
that.  See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2451–54 (2015) (striking down 
an ordinance allowing totally suspicion-less searches of hotel registries, but holding that 
only an administrative subpoena—i.e., suspicion far short of probable cause—renders the 
searches constitutionally reasonable). 
 6 See Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by Numbers:  Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. 
REV. 35, 38–42 (2014) (offering examples of how private companies have begun collect-
ing and harnessing consumer data); see generally; Brown, supra note 3, at 621–34 (explor-
ing how the rise of digital communication—and surveillance—has changed law enforce-
ment practices); Joh, supra, at 38–42 (discussing how the availability of big data stands to 
impact law enforcement practices). 7 See, e.g., Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big 
Brother’s Little Helpers:  How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package 
Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595 (2003); Brennan-
Marquez, supra note 3, at 6–10. 
 7 See, e.g., Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers:  How ChoicePoint and Other Commer-
cial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & 
COM. REG. 595 (2003); Brennan-Marquez, supra note 3, at 6–10. 
 8 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
 9 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
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Executives’ Ass’n.10  Having done so, I argue (1) that all three holdings 
are correct, but (2) that the private search rule is not necessary to 
ground any of them, because all three are equally—if not more easi-
ly—justified by an outsourced law enforcement principle.  Finally, I 
show that the private search rule has, not surprisingly, led to uncom-
fortable results in practice—and that the discomfort can be remedied 
by focusing on outsourced law enforcement. 
But first, we begin with an outlandish hypothetical, designed to 
highlight the doctrinal quandary that would result from private con-
duct becoming a practical substitute for the labor of state officials.  
One could be forgiven for having thought our constitutional law 
sturdy enough to contend with such obvious substitution effects.  For-
tunately, there is room yet to grow. 
I.  AN OUTLANDISH HYPOTHETICAL 
Imagine a world in which the everyday investigative activity of 
rank-and-file police officers—patrolling the streets, responding to 
calls of distress, and so on—has disappeared.  Instead, this role is 
played exclusively by private companies.  Security firms, collectively 
employed by local merchants and homeowners, roam around public 
streets and sidewalks, scouting out criminal behavior.  Detective 
agencies, hired by victims, locate perpetrators and build cases against 
them.  Communications firms—phone companies, internet service 
providers, and the like—monitor all user correspondence.  Financial 
institutions employ sophisticated algorithms to track illicit activity.  
Furthermore, these private companies are not merely engaged in 
constant surveillance; they also turn over the fruits of their surveil-
lance to law enforcement agencies, who then parley the resulting evi-
dence into (1) search warrants and (2) convictions.  In short, imagine 
a world in which law enforcement has not disappeared, but the initial 
stages of investigation occur entirely in the private realm. 
Naturally, I am not trying to suggest that this state of affairs re-
flects social reality today—or even that it is likely to reflect social real-
ity in the future.11  The point is that, in a world like the one just de-
scribed, Fourth Amendment protection—if understood as existing 
 
 10 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
 11 That being said, some of these imagined developments are certainly more plausible than 
others.  Constant, indiscriminate data surveillance by private corporations is increasingly 
becoming the norm.  And private security has, of course, long been a lucrative industry 
with clear, if complicated, ties to law enforcement.  See, e.g., Sklansky, supra note 3, at 
1117–93 (exploring the role that private security forces play in the contemporary world 
alongside law enforcement). 
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doctrine would have it—would fall by the wayside.  There would, in 
effect, be no Fourth Amendment.  All searches would be private 
searches, and the private actors carrying out those searches would not 
be agents or instruments of the government.  Thus, when law en-
forcement used of the fruits of those searches (for example, to au-
thorize subsequent searches), it simply would not qualify as a consti-
tutional event. 
But this result seems wrong—indeed, deeply wrong.  If the enter-
prise of criminal investigation were fully privatized, but still formed 
the basis of public law enforcement, it cannot be that Fourth 
Amendment protection would simply evaporate.  The question, in 
what follows, is why the private search rule seems to yield this result; 
and how it might be retooled so as to avoid it. 
II.  THE “AGENT OR INSTRUMENT” TEST 
To begin, it is worth considering the genesis of the private search 
rule.  What inspired the Court to devise a rule focused on the tem-
poral ordering of collaboration between law enforcement and private 
actors?  And more importantly:  do the cases that gave rise to this in-
spiration genuinely depend on the principle for which they apparent-
ly stand? 
After the Court’s watershed opinion in Katz v. United States,12 
which ushered in the modern era of Fourth Amendment law, its first 
enunciation of the private search rule came in Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire.13  The police suspected Edward Coolidge of kidnapping and 
murdering a fourteen-year-old girl.14  In the course of building their 
case, the police visited Coolidge’s home, which resulted in, among 
other things, their speaking with Coolidge’s wife.15  At the end of the 
visit, Mrs. Coolidge voluntarily handed over various items—numerous 
guns, as well the clothes that Coolidge had been wearing the day the 
girl disappeared—which ended up incriminating him.16 
Coolidge moved to suppress the items on the grounds that “when 
Mrs. Coolidge brought out the guns and clothing, and then handed 
them over to the police, she was acting as an ‘instrument’ of the offi-
 
 12 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (rejecting the trespass doctrine of Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence and, instead, describing the Fourth Amendment as a law that “protects people, not 
places”). 
 13 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 487. 
 14 Id. at 445–46. 
 15 Id. at 446. 
 16 Id. 
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cials.”17  The Court rejected Coolidge’s argument, reasoning that the 
police had not “coerce[d] or dominate[d] [Mrs. Coolidge], or, for 
that matter . . . direct[ed] her actions by the more subtle techniques 
of suggestion that are available to officials in circumstances like the-
se.”18  In short, when Mrs. Coolidge provided evidence to the police, 
she was acting of her own volition, not as an instrument of the state.  
So the Fourth Amendment, far from being violated, was not even trig-
gered.  As the Court put it: 
[I]t is no part of the policy underlying the Fourth . . . Amendment[] to 
discourage citizens from aiding to the utmost of their ability in the ap-
prehension of criminals.  If, then, the exclusionary rule is properly appli-
cable to the evidence taken from the Coolidge house . . . it must be upon 
the basis that some type of unconstitutional police conduct occurred.19 
Since Coolidge, the doctrinal elaboration has been sparse.  In fact, 
only two cases are squarely on point.20  The first case is United States v. 
Jacobsen, in which the Court held that no search occurred—and 
therefore, no Fourth Amendment scrutiny applied—when a FedEx 
handler examined the contents of a broken package and, suspicious 
that it contained drugs, called the Drug Enforcement Administation 
(“DEA”). 21  The Court was not impressed by Jacobsen’s argument 
that the handler’s decision to examine the package and alert the rel-
evant authorities rendered him an agent or instrument of the state.22  
Nor did the Court think it relevant that the handler might have in-
 
 17 Id. at 487. 
 18 Id. at 489. 
 19 Id. at 488. 
 20 A third, and related, case is Walter v. United States, in which the Court determined—
essentially sub silentio—that it was not a Fourth Amendment violation for an employee of a 
(private) company to open a package of video tapes that had mistakenly been delivered 
to the premises.  447 U.S. 649–51 (1980).  The large bulk of the Court’s analysis in Walter 
focused on whether law enforcement could perform a search beyond the initial (private) 
search—if it constituted a Fourth Amendment violation for law enforcement to watch the 
tapes, when the private actor had not.  See id. at 651–52.  The Court said yes, on the theo-
ry that when law enforcement expands the scope of a private search, the Fourth Amend-
ment clock resets, to so speak.  See id. at 659.  Nevertheless, the premise underlying the 
Walter Court’s analysis was that the initial private search—when the employees opened 
the package—did not even come under Fourth Amendment scrutiny, much less make out 
a Fourth Amendment violation.  See id.  For a helpful discussion of the “expanded search” 
rule, see Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 554–
56 (2005). 
 21 See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114–15 (1984). 
 22 See id. (“[T]he fact that agents of the private carrier independently opened the package 
and made an examination that might have been impermissible for a government agent 
cannot render otherwise reasonable official conduct unreasonable. . . . [Here] [t]he ini-
tial invasions of respondents’ package were occasioned by private action.”). 
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tentionally—or even maliciously—dismantled the package.23  For the 
Court, the important point was that the “initial invasion[] of re-
spondents’ package [was] occasioned by private action.”24  That fact 
alone ended the analysis. 
The second case, Skinner v. Railway Executives’ Labor Ass’n, came 
down a few years after Jacobsen.25  In Skinner, the Court confronted a 
question whose answer was logically implied by the reasoning of Coo-
lidge and Jacobsen, but was nevertheless an open issue of law:  do pri-
vate actors become agents or instruments of the state if they are legal-
ly required to perform searches?  The answer, naturally, was yes.26  
Were it otherwise, legislative bodies could circumvent Fourth 
Amendment protection at will—by deputizing private actors to per-
form searches that would otherwise fall to law enforcement.  In fact, 
the Skinner Court went slightly further, holding that private searches 
facilitated by a regulatory scheme—but not compelled—can nonethe-
less qualify as Fourth Amendment searches, if the government “re-
move[s] all legal barriers to [a given type of search] and indeed 
[makes] plain not only its strong preference for [searches], but also 
its desire to share the fruits of [the] intrusions.”27  In short, it is possi-
ble for a statutory scheme to deputize private actors as state agents 
without explicitly requiring that they perform searches. 
So stands the Court’s private search jurisprudence.  There are a 
number of things to notice about Coolidge, Jacobsen, and Skinner.  The 
first is that all three cases are sensible—in fact, I would call them un-
deniably right—on both normative and pragmatic grounds.  We want 
spouses (and roommates, and similarly situated private actors) to be 
free to cooperate with law enforcement.  After all, their safety—or the 
safety of others in the home, such as children—may depend on it.28  
Similarly, it is hard to find fault with an employee of FedEx determin-
 
 23 Id. at 115 (indicating that it is irrelevant whether the intrusion was “accidental or deliber-
ate”); see also id. at 115 n.10 (“A post-trial affidavit indicates that an agent of Federal Ex-
press may have opened the package because he was suspicious about its contents, and not 
because of damage from a forklift. . . . [But this] affidavit . . . is of no relevance to the is-
sue we decide [here].”). 
 24 Id. at 115. 
 25 Skinner v. Ry. Execs.’ Labor Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
 26 Id. at 614–16. 
 27 Id. at 615. 
 28 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126 (2014) 
(No. 12-7822) (illustrating how counsel for petitioner—in the course of arguing that a 
Fourth Amendment violation occurred—conceded the importance of letting co-tenants 
search the private effects of other co-tenants); Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 145–49 
(2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining the normative rationale behind the Coolidge 
rule). 
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ing it appropriate, on a one-off basis, to alert the authorities about a 
suspicious package.  Suppose the package is dangerous or suppose 
that a package’s illicit contents are inadvertently revealed—as in Ja-
cobsen29—and the employee is worried that he, his colleagues, or the 
company will get into trouble unless he reports the package.  In cases 
like these, it seems plain that the Fourth Amendment should not 
constrain one-off cooperation with law enforcement.  And Skinner, fi-
nally, may be the easiest case of all.30  Of course a private actor becomes 
an extension of the government when the law requires, or actively 
encourages, the actor to perform searches with law enforcement ram-
ifications. 
The second thing to notice about Coolidge, Jacobsen, and Skinner is 
that all three holdings, though forged in the agent or instrument 
mold, are equally compatible with an outsourced law enforcement 
test.  In cases like Skinner, where the law imposes an obligation to 
search, outsourcing is explicit.31  But more importantly, in neither 
Coolidge nor Jacobsen did the private actor—Mrs. Coolidge, or the 
FedEx handler—step into the shoes of law enforcement.  Rather, 
both actors assisted the police spontaneously.  It is possible, of course, 
that one or both of them was motivated by a desire to further law en-
forcement ends.32  But this, by itself, does not mean that their efforts 
supplanted the need for policing.  Rather, they facilitated the enter-
prise. 
The third thing to notice is that Skinner, by characterizing a pri-
vate company’s decision to perform urine and breathalyzer tests as 
state action, already puts strain on the agent or instrument test.  Ac-
cording to the Court, when the government enables a private search—
by, for example, removing a set of regulatory obstacles—the govern-
 
 29 See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 111. 
 30 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 613–14. 
 31 This points to a broader conceptual relationship between “agent or instrument” test and 
the “outsourced law enforcement” test.  The latter does not repudiate the former; in-
stead, it extends it.  Every case that the agent or instrument test reaches, the outsourced 
policing test also reaches, because whenever private actors operate as instruments of the 
state, they are—by necessity—outsourcing the police function.  There is no risk, in other 
words, that an outsourced law enforcement test would somehow end up being less protec-
tive than the agent or instrument test.  Rather, the outsourced law enforcement test en-
capsulates all fact patterns that come under the agent or instrument umbrella—and 
more. 
 32 Jacobsen is more ambiguous, but in Coolidge, this is almost certainly the case.  When she 
handed evidence over to the police, Mrs. Coolidge almost certainly intended to aid law 
enforcement—though she probably thought her assistance would help exculpate her hus-
band, not further incriminate him.  See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 486 (indicating that Mrs. Coo-
lidge declared that she and her husband “had [nothing] to hide” when she furnished the 
incriminating evidence to the police). 
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ment can be understood, on that basis alone, as “encourag[ing], 
endors[ing], and participat[ing] [in]” the search.33  Although this re-
sult certainly has normative appeal, it represents a departure from 
the agent or instrument test.  Under normal principles of agency law, 
that A enables B to do something does not render B an agent of A; it 
is possible for the “enabling” condition to be satisfied without any 
formal agency relationship taking hold.34  Indeed, Skinner itself is an 
example.  There, the private company saw no benefit in exchange for 
performing searches, nor did it face any penalty for declining to per-
form searches.  Rather, the decision to perform searches was volun-
tary.35  By subjecting that decision to constitutional scrutiny, the 
Court implicitly acknowledged that agency relationships—at least in 
the sense familiar to agency law—are not the thing (or not the only 
thing) we find troubling about cooperation between law enforcement 
officials and the private sector.36 
III.  OUTSOURCED LAW ENFORCEMENT 
So, in sum:  the agent or instrument test rests on, if not precarious 
ground, certainly ground less firm than one might glean from a case-
book.  If—as I tried to show in the last Part—the test is unnecessary, 
logically or doctrinally, to explain the (sound) holdings of Coolidge, 
Jacobsen, and Skinner, the question becomes more overtly normative.  
 
 33 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615–16. 
 34 See, e.g., Redco Constr. v. Profile Props., 271 P.3d 408, 421 (Wyo. 2012) (holding that no 
agency relationship was formed when a landlord approved a tenant to make repairs on 
the latter's apartment—notwithstanding the fact that such approval was an enabling con-
dition of the repairs); Intercity Maint. Co. v. Local 254 Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 62 F. 
Supp. 2d 483 (D.R.I. 1999), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 241 F.3d 82 (1st Cir. 2001), cert. 
denied, 534 U.S. 818 (2001) (explaining that agency relationship is created by a manifesta-
tion of the principal, not the alleged agent, that the principal consents to have the acts 
done on his behalf); 19 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 54:14 (4th ed. 2015) (explaining 
that “[t]he relationship of principal and agent . . . requires mutual consent,” and in par-
ticular that it “turns on the intentions and actions of the putative principal, not the agent” 
(emphasis added)); Brennan-Marquez, supra note 3, at 33–34. 
 35 Brennan-Marquez, supra note 3, at 32; see also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 132 S. Ct. 2652, 
2666 (2013) (“[A]gency requires more than mere authorization to assert a particular in-
terest.  ‘An essential element of agency is the principal’s right to control the agent’s ac-
tions.’” (citing Restatement (Third) of Agency § 1.01, Comment f (2005))).  
 36 Of course, one variable present in Skinner, but not present in the lion’s share of Fourth 
Amendment cases, is a “special need,” apart from law enforcement, justifying the searches 
in question.  See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619–20 (recognizing the “Government’s interest in 
regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure safety”).  So, in a sense, it was very 
“safe” for the Court to see the private conduct as state action.  Even supposing this is true, 
however, it is still remarkable that the Court was inclined—even under “safe” condi-
tions—to view the conduct as state action despite the clear absence of an agency relation-
ship. 
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Namely, is the agent or instrument test desirable?  Does it convincingly 
resolve the great run of cases that fall into the umbrella category of 
private searches? 
To see why the answer is no, one need look no further than appel-
late jurisprudence.  Charged with filling the considerable gaps left by 
Coolidge, Jacobsen, and Skinner, lower courts have settled on two criteria 
of state agency.37  The first is whether the state instigated, compen-
sated, or otherwise encouraged the search.  The second is whether 
the private actor, in performing the search, intended to assist law en-
forcement.  Some courts, furthermore, have simply “compressed” the 
two criteria together,38 into a “fact-intensive inquiry” that asks “wheth-
er the government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct 
and whether the private party’s purpose for conducting the search 
was to assist law enforcement efforts or to further her own ends.”39 
As it turns out, however, the second criterion is largely a mirage—
as it must be, if “common law agency principles,”40 from which the 
agent or instrument test is derived, truly reign supreme.  It is black-
letter agency law that A does not become B’s agent simply because A 
acts:  (1) in a way that benefits B; and (2) out of a desire to benefit B.  
 
 37 See, e.g., id. at 614–15 (pointing out, not all that helpfully, that the state agency analysis 
should turn on:  (1) the “circumstances” of a search; and (2) “the degree of the Govern-
ment’s participation in the private party’s activities”). 
 38 See, e.g., United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 345 (2003). 
 39 United States v. Ellyson, 326 F.3d 522, 527 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also United States v. D’Andrea, 648 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2011) (explaining 
that the agent or instrument test depends on “the extent of the government’s role in in-
stigating or participating in the search, its intent and the degree of control it exercises 
over the search and the private party, and the extent to which the private party aims pri-
marily to help the government or to serve its own interests” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The general princi-
ples for determining whether a private individual is acting as a governmental instrument 
or agent for Fourth Amendment purposes have been synthesized into a two part test.  Ac-
cording to this test, we must inquire:  (1) whether the government knew of and acqui-
esced in the intrusive conduct; and (2) whether the party performing the search intend-
ed to assist law enforcement efforts or further his own ends.” (citations omitted)).  Some 
courts tend—at least in the abstract—to give one prong of the analysis more weight than 
the other.  Compare United States v. Huber, 404 F.3d 1047, 1053–54 (8th Cir. 2005) (sug-
gesting that law enforcement must have some involvement in the search for it to become 
state action—no matter how much the private actor is motivated by a law enforcement 
purpose), with United States v. Bowers, 594 F.3d 522, 526 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that 
for a search to be private, “the intent of the private party conducting the search [must be] en-
tirely independent of the . . . collect[ion] [of] evidence for use in a criminal prosecution” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 40 See, e.g., Ellyson, 326 F.3d at 527; see also United States v. Koenig, 856 F.2d 843, 847 n.1 
(7th Cir. 1988) (looking to the “common law of agency” to determine whether a private 
actor was operating as a state agent). 
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Rather, some action on B’s part is necessary.41  It hardly comes as a 
surprise, then, a Fourth Amendment test patterned on agency princi-
ples would inspire courts to treat prodding by law enforcement (of 
some kind) as a necessary, if not always sufficient, condition of state 
action. 
Consider the following five cases, all of which have come out the 
same way—no Fourth Amendment violation.  What is more remarka-
ble, however, is that all five have come out the same way for the same 
reason—they all involve purely private searches—and this, in spite of 
the fact that in every case, an intention to assist law enforcement is 
part of (if not entirely) what brought about the search.42 
1. The fearful spouse:  concerned for her safety, Thelma decides to rifle 
through her husband’s things, searching for contraband; when she finds 
it, she turns the contraband over to law enforcement.43 
2. The nosy roommate:  concerned that his roommate may be dealing 
drugs, Joe decides to look through their apartment for evidence while his 
roommate is out; when he finds a bag of illicit pills, Joe calls the police.44 
3. The suspicious courier:  Maureen, a FedEx worker, and an avid propo-
nent of the war on drugs, takes it upon herself to dismantle and examine 
the contents of any package that appears, on the surface, to contain 
drugs.  When Maureen locates drugs (or something that appears to be 
drugs), she alerts law enforcement.45 
 
 41 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 42 Doctrinally, it is not surprising that courts have shied away from making “law enforce-
ment motives” the relevant variable.  To do so—that is, to embrace the proposition that a 
desire to assist law enforcement can, standing alone, transform private conduct into state 
action—runs headlong into the notion that private actors should be free, as a general 
matter, to assist law enforcement.  See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 116–17 
(2005) (explaining that when private parties relay incriminating evidence to law en-
forcement, it serves society’s interest in “bringing criminal activity to light”).  That is not 
to say the two propositions are irreconcilable, but a more nuanced account is required.  
See generally Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Fourth Amendment Fiduciaries, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 101 
(2015) (arguing that when information fiduciaries—whom we expect to hold our infor-
mation in trust—voluntarily assist with law enforcement, it poses distinct privacy con-
cerns, which might theoretically limit the scope of the “law enforcement motivation” 
principle). 
 43 See United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 458–59 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that it was 
purely private conduct when a wife entered her husband’s ranch without his permis-
sion—indeed, over his attempt to keep her out—to search the premises).  In some sense, 
this result is already encapsulated by Coolidge itself.  See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 145 (Thom-
as, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court held in [Coolidge] that no Fourth Amendment search oc-
curs where, as here, the spouse of an accused voluntarily leads the police to potential evi-
dence of wrongdoing by the accused.”). 
 44 See Bowers, 594 F.3d at 525–27 (holding that it was a purely private search when defend-
ant’s roommate and her boyfriend entered defendant’s room, removed a photo album, 
and gave it to the police). 
 45 See United States v. Koenig, 856 F.2d 843, 848 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding, per Jacobsen, that 
the private search rule applies to the activity of a FedEx employee who exhibited particu-
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4. The conscientious corporation:  AOL, deciding that it wants to support 
the war against child pornography, begins filtering user email for at-
tachments that resemble known contraband; when its algorithm turns up 
a match, AOL sends in a human observer to verify the result and to pre-
pare a report for the National Center for Missing and Exploited Chil-
dren.46 
5. The vigilante hacker:  Erica, a skilled programmer, decides to locate 
criminals, hack into their computers—illegally—and furnish whatever ev-
idence she finds to law enforcement.47 
This is where I suggest that it is astonishing—a sorry example of 
legal formalism—that existing Fourth Amendment law cannot tell 
these cases apart.  The problem, to be clear, is not that all five cases 
necessarily came out incorrectly (though for some of them, that may 
be true, too).  The problem is that beyond transpiring in the private 
realm, with no law enforcement involvement, the searches in these 
cases are not remotely similar. 
In the first two cases, the private action looks nothing like law en-
forcement, and therefore (just as the relevant courts held), it should 
not implicate, much less violate, the privacy interests codified in 
Fourth Amendment law.  Both the fearful spouse and the nosy 
roommate:  (1) opt to investigate another person’s activity for per-
sonal reasons (because they share living space); (2) have very limited 
interaction with law enforcement; and (3) cease to engage in any 
kind of surveillance activity once incriminating evidence is located.  
One can imagine versions of each case, of course, where some or all 
of these variables change, and the analysis might change accordingly.  
For example, suppose Thelma is married to a mob boss and—having 
experienced a change of heart—begins performing surreptitious sur-
veillance of her husband’s activity, including searches of his personal 
effects, and continually relaying the fruits to law enforcement.  In 
that case, the husband’s Fourth Amendment interests may well be 
 
lar enthusiasm for law enforcement, having “contacted the DEA at least eight times” over 
the course of his employment).  This reasoning, it bears note, was prefigured by Jacobsen 
itself, when the Court deemed it irrelevant to the private search analysis that the FedEx 
employee “may have opened the package because he was suspicious about its contents, 
and not because of damage from a forklift.”  United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115 
n.3 (1984). 
 46 See United States v. Stevenson, 727 F.3d 826, 829–30 (8th Cir. 2013) (holding that AOL 
was operating as a private actor, not a state agent, when it decided to hash email traffic 
for child pornography and other contraband); United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 
366–67 (4th Cir. 2010) (same). 
 47 See United States v. Jarrett, 338 F.3d 339, 344–45 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that an anony-
mous hacker’s search of defendant’s computer did not violate the Fourth Amendment—
despite involving the commission of a criminal offense—because the Government did not 
“participat[e],” but rather “passively accept[ed] . . . a private party’s search efforts”). 
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implicated.48  And the reason the husband’s interests would be impli-
cated is that Thelma has effectively substituted her own efforts for the 
labor of law enforcement; in the absence of her help, state officials 
would have to build their own case, in compliance with the Fourth 
Amendment.  (Notice, further, that this analysis would hold equally 
true if the officials had recruited Thelma—as the agent or instrument 
test would focus on—or if Thelma stepped into the role of her own 
accord.) 
In the last two cases, by contrast, the private action does look quite 
a bit like law enforcement conduct. And Fourth Amendment interests 
come, accordingly, to the fore.  The cleanest example is the vigilante 
hacker, who not only targets criminals on a specific and ongoing ba-
sis—just as law enforcement officials do—but who also breaks the law 
to perform the searches in question.  The latter is, of course, a privi-
lege we extend to law enforcement officials—they may enter private 
homes without permission, seize property, and so on—but only if 
they adhere to specific constraints, as codified in the Fourth 
Amendment.49  When a private actor flouts the law in order to inves-
tigate criminal activity, equivalent constraints should exist. 
A similar analysis applies to the conscientious corporation case.  
To the extent that AOL’s email monitoring violates the law (or, like-
wise, the company’s terms of use), there is a direct analogy to the vigi-
lante hacker case—if anything, the conscientious corporation case is 
that much more disturbing, given the asymmetry of power involved.  
But even if the email monitoring is not formally against the law, the 
same core problem arises; it still represents an egregious abuse of 
AOL’s position of power, and its outsized surveillance capacity.  At 
some level, this is exactly what the Fourth Amendment aims to safe-
guard us against.  Furthermore, regardless of whether users have 
 
 48 Although it is well-settled that police may rely on information or evidence voluntarily 
shared with confidential informants, see, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 
(1971), courts have refrained—not surprisingly—from extending the same logic to in-
formation or evidence procured by a confidential informant surreptitiously.  See, e.g., Hoffa 
v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (explaining that the Fourth Amendment pro-
vides no bulwark against “a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he volun-
tarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it” (emphasis added)); United States v. Davis, 
326 F.3d 361, 366 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights 
were not violated when an informant recorded a drug deal because the informant “did 
not seize anything from [defendant] without his knowledge,” but rather used “[a] hidden 
camera merely [to] memorialize[] what [he] was able to see as an invited guest”). 
 49 See Malcolm Thorburn, Justifications, Powers, and Authority, 117 YALE L. J. 1070, 1103–07 
(2008) (describing the warrant requirement as a “justification”—analogous to justifica-
tion defenses in criminal—that immunize police officers from liability for otherwise-
tortious and/or criminal acts). 
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been put on notice (formally speaking) about the likelihood of data 
surveillance, the corporation’s activity remains an obvious substitu-
tion for that of law enforcement officials, who would otherwise need 
some degree of particularized suspicion to examine the contents of 
user email.50  In short, dragnet email surveillance by private actors 
works a clear end-run around the Fourth Amendment’s protections. 
The middle case—the suspicious courier—is the hardest.  In one 
sense, the suspicious courier is simply a hyperbolic version of the 
handler in Jacobsen.51  In another sense, however, she has clearly ven-
tured farther into the territory of law enforcement than the FedEx 
worker in Jacobsen—her searches are imbued, at every moment, with 
the desire to catch criminals, and her relationship with the police is 
ongoing rather than spontaneous.  Indeed, from a certain perspec-
tive, the suspicious courier case is not unlike the conscientious corpo-
ration case; the pre-digital form of an email-hashing program would 
be (something like) a courier service opening every package that 
passes through its facilities, and reporting the contents to law en-
forcement.  There is, of course, a difference between a firm-wide pol-
icy to examine the contents of every package, on the one hand, and 
an individual employee’s decision (perhaps without the firm’s bless-
ing) to open specific packages, on the other.52  And that may well be a 
reason not to see the suspicious courier case as outsourced law en-
forcement.  Ultimately, however, it is hard to avoid the conclusion 
that at some point, private investigative activity of the kind on display 
in Jacobsen—and equally, in the suspicious courier example—tips over 
into substitute law enforcement. 
*** 
The point of these examples is not to establish precise criteria of 
outsourced law enforcement, or to draw fine distinctions between sib-
 
 50 See, e.g., Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 910 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding 
that users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages, despite advance 
warning that the messages could be read), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. City of Ontario v. 
Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010); Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 482 (6th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of stored 
email), vacated en banc on other grounds, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 51 For its part, the Seventh Circuit was undaunted in United States v. Koenig, the case from 
which the suspicious courier case is derived, by the observation that the FedEx worker 
had a propensity for assisting law enforcement.  See United States v. Koenig, 856 F.2d 843, 
848 (7th Cir. 1988) 
 52 It should be noted, however, that in Koenig, the handler’s ongoing investigative activity did 
have the firm’s blessing.  See id. (explaining that a protocol for detecting and intercepting 
illicit packages had been codified in at least one internal memorandum). 
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ling cases.  That effort awaits a longer meditation.53  In fact, I have 
sought here—on purpose—to paint with a broad brush because do-
ing so helps, I think, to underscore how modest the central claim is.  
In contrast to existing private search jurisprudence, which can dis-
cern no distinction whatsoever between a case like the nosy room-
mate and a case like the vigilante hacker, I want to urge—in a lawyer-
ly spirit—that distinctions do exist, and that in practice, more precise 
lines can and should be drawn. 
One last proviso before concluding:  to accept that certain forms 
of private investigative activity rise to the level of substitute law en-
forcement is not to deem such activity unconstitutional.  Rather, it is 
to acknowledge the need for Fourth Amendment scrutiny—
reasonableness review—in the first instance.  In other words, the pos-
ture of my argument is largely defensive.  The point is not that, going 
forward, private searches will often violate the Fourth Amendment in 
practice; in some settings they might, while in other settings, they 
likely will not.  The point is that private searches have the capacity to 
violate the Fourth Amendment in principle. 
Instead of assuming, as current doctrine does, that private investi-
gative activity can never impinge on our constitutional interests, 
courts should begin to ask, instead, (1) how it might, and when it 
does, (2) what qualifies as “reasonable.”  I have trouble imagining 
that the vigilante hacker case could, under any facts, clear this bar.  
But it is not inconceivable that the conscientious corporation could.  
Suppose, for example, that the email surveillance program is narrow-
ly (and reliably) targeted to contraband at the exclusion of every-
thing else, such that user email is not examined by a human (an em-
ployee or a law enforcement official) until it is virtually certain to 
contain illicit material.  Perhaps in this case, we would want to say 
that the corporation is performing reasonable searches.  Still, the im-
 
 53 That said, a number of loose criteria have emerged in the analysis so far.  First, did the 
private search involve a violation of existing law?  Second, how ongoing was the relation-
ship—even if it was an entirely voluntary relationship—between the private actor and law 
enforcement?  Third, did the search (or searches) have a suspicion-less, “dragnet” quality 
that reflects the chief concern of the Fourth Amendment’s ratification at the time of the 
founding?  See also Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1252–53 (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The Fourth Amendment was adopted specifically in re-
sponse to the Crown’s practice of using general warrants and writs of assistance to search 
‘suspected places’ for evidence of smuggling, libel, or other crimes.  Early patriots railed 
against these practices as ‘the worst instrument of arbitrary power’ and John Adams later 
claimed that ‘the child Independence was born’ from colonists’ opposition to their use.” 
(citations omitted)). 
812 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 18:3 
 
portant point for our immediate purposes is that the corporation is 
performing searches at all. 
CONCLUSION:  PRIVATE SEARCHES IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA 
The agent or instrument construction of the private search rule 
makes effortless sense in a world where government officials perform 
the vast majority of surveillance, and the key concern is that private 
actors will become—often against their will—pawns of the state.  The 
agent or instrument construction makes considerably less sense in a 
world where, in practice, surveillance often takes root in the private 
realm, and ground-floor investigative work, once the sole province of 
the state, is effectively farmed out to private actors.  What will law en-
forcement, and the rules governing law enforcement, look like in 
such world? 
This Essay has sought to propose the rudiments of an answer, by 
arguing that the agent or instrument test—the Fourth Amendment’s 
traditional response to the problem of private searching—cannot 
hope to sustain the normative burden required of it in the digital 
age.54  Instead of focusing on the status of the actor who performs a 
given search, the doctrine should focus on whether the conduct in-
volved in a given search effectively outsources the law enforcement 
function.  In many cases, the two approaches overlap.  But in a specif-
ic subset of cases, they do not—cases in which private actors, corpo-
rate or individual, become like vigilantes, taking up the mantle of law 
enforcement voluntarily.  The rules governing such voluntary support 
for law enforcement were crafted in an era when private actors had 
little capacity to keep tabs on one another, much less to collect, ar-
chive, and mine vast reservoirs of personal information. 
But that era is long past.  Ours is an era of ever-multiplying data—
and ever-increasing data surveillance.  Law enforcement officials have 
taken note of this new reality.  And so have the class of private ac-
tors—corporations that deal in big data—best poised to assist them.  





 54 See Sklansky, supra note 3, at 1230 (referring to the distinction between private actors that 
have been “officially deputized” and those that have not been as “arbitrary” and responsi-
ble for “conspicuous incongruities”). 
